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Introduction
The legal doctrine of odious debt began with Alexander Sack's
seminal work' in 1927,' but the doctrine's roots are perhaps as
ancient as the idea that a ruler's legitimacy is contingent on an
obligation to pursue the public interest.2 Saddam Hussein's fall
t Principal at Boston Provident, an investment firm specializing in the financial
services sector. Contact: Jshafter@Bprov.com. I would like to thank Michael Kremer
and Seema Jayachadran whose contributions to the development of the ideas in this
paper are too great for conventional citation. I would also like to thank Jason Gottlieb,
my colleague on the International Law Committee of the New York City Bar
Association, and Roberta Shafter for her invaluable editorial assistance.
I See ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR
LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCItRES [THE EFFECTS OF THE
TRANSFORMATIONS OF STATES ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBT AND OTHER FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS] (1927). In the interest of saving both the unnecessary destruction of trees
and the reader's attention-span, I will rely on the numerous well-written explications of
the odious debt doctrine found elsewhere in this volume rather than present the doctrine
and its background de novo. The classic definition of odious debts as debts incurred
without public consent and utilized for illegitimate purposes with creditor awareness of
these facts is assumed throughout the paper. Id. at 127. While debts incurred out of
proportion to the prudent fiscal resources of a state but with no additional illegitimating
factors are a significant problem, they are outside the scope of this work.
2 In Western thought this concept is often attributed, at least in its formal
enunciation, to John Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(Cambridgeshire ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). But the idea that the
legitimacy of a leader's actions is not absolute but contingent upon some form of public
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from power triggered the current upsurge in attention to odious
debts. The range of voices demanding relief for the new Iraqi
government from Saddam's debts is staggering. It is unlikely that
many other policy initiatives could unite such individuals and
organizations as Joseph Stiglitz,3 Oxfam,4 the Cato Institute,5 and
the Heritage Foundation.6 When Naomi Klein and the Wall Street
Journal editorial staff share a common agenda, prospects seem
uncommonly high for bipartisan action.7
Unfortunately, the current Iraqi debt relief has come in the
form of ad hoc forgiveness rather than a new general policy
approach to sovereign debt.8 Odious debt reform efforts seem
mandate emerged in different forms far earlier than the Enlightenment era. For example,
in China the "Mandate of Heaven" was used to justify the transfer of power from the
Shang to the Zhou dynasty in 1046 B.C. See F.W. MOTE, IMPERIAL CHINA: 900-1800, at
8-10 (1999); see also Piero Tozzi, Note, Constitutional Reform on Taiwan: Fulfilling a
Chinese Notion of Democratic Sovereignty?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1193, 1194 (1995)
("In classical Chinese thought, an emperor legitimately wielding the 'Mandate of
Heaven' ruled for the benefit of the people; if he ceased to place their welfare
paramount, popular revolt was justified."). In another setting, political scientist Daniel
Elazar has written extensively on the idea that the concept of the covenant-a voluntarily
contracted pact of bilateral responsibilities and obligations-was the structure through
which the ancient Israelites developed their relationship both to the divine and to their
earthly rulers. See generally DANIEL ELAZAR, COVENANT AND POLITY IN BIBLICAL
ISRAEL: BIBLICAL FOUNDATIONS AND JEWISH EXPRESSIONS (1995).
3 Joseph Stiglitz, Odious Rulers, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2003,
at 39-45.
4 A Fresh Start for Iraq: The Case for Debt Relief, Oxfam International Briefing
Paper No. 48, May 2003, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_wedo/issues/
debtaid/downloads/bp48_iraqdebt.pdf.
5 Patricia Adams, Iraq's Odious Debts, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 526,
Sept. 28, 2004, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa526.pdf.
6 Nile Gardner and Marc Miles, Forgive the Iraqi Debt, The Heritage Foundation
Executive Memorandum No. 871, Apr. 30, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/Research/
TradeandForeignAid/em871 .cfm.
7 See Naomi Klein, Not Neo-Con, Just Plain Greed; The U.S. Campaign to Have
Iraq's Debts Forgiven Shows How the Bush Administration Backs any Market Distortion
that Enriches its Friends, GLOBE & MAIL (CAN.), Dec. 20, 2003, at A27; Op-Ed., The
Future of Iraq, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2003, at A26.
8 In 2004, then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the House
Committee on International Relations that the Iraqi situation was unique and that
therefore "Secretary Baker, in seeking reduction of at least the vast majority of Iraq's
debt, has stressed these unique factors, instead of relying on the odious debt argument."
The President's International Affairs Request for Fiscal Year 2005: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 108th Cong. 108-88 (2004).
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trapped in a frustrating political cycle. There is a substantial and
warranted legal reluctance to establishing retroactive penalties for
actions taken before promulgation of a new rule.9 This taboo is
occasionally breached but only with caution. Aside from basic
principles of justice, our economy would cease to function if
confidence was lost that long-term agreements could be forged
within a stable legal framework. Thus, when the collapse of a
dictatorial regime reveals a legacy of crippling odious debts it is
already too late. But mustering political capital for prospective
odious debt reform is difficult since there is no manifest public
injustice to rally supporters around. Eventually attention to odious
debt trails off until the next tragic iteration of the cycle.
Right now there is a residual political consciousness that
odious debts are problematic. In addition, enough time has passed
since the fall of Saddam Hussein that the topic can be discussed in
terms of a general, forward-looking solution. This window of
opportunity will not remain open forever.
I. Problems with Judicial Strategies of Reform
A. The Recognition Power
Very few skeptics of odious debt reform defend the utility or
morality of debts incurred by regimes lacking public consent and
used for illegitimate purposes.'l Rather, reform skeptics argue that
upending established practices of regime succession to sovereign
debts would have a dangerous, destabilizing impact on the global
financial system.11 But on the whole, opponents of odious debt
9 For a description of the history of and rationale for the practice of "prospective"
overruling, see Walter Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective
Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (1967).
10 While there are epistemological difficulties in proving a negative through
empirical observation, see KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
(Routledge Classics 2002) (1935), limited research on the part of the author finds no
writer making such claims. But it is almost certain that someone, somewhere is making
the argument that it is rank imperialism for Western nations to impose their constructs of
popular consent on the third world.
I I See Raghuram Rajan, Odious or Just Malodorous: Why the Odious Debt
Proposal is Likely to Stay in Cold Storage, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2004, at 54-55, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/12/pdf/straight.pdf; Mark Medish,
Op-Ed., Make Baghdad Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at 25.
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reform are safely outnumbered by supporters. Why then have
reforms never gained political momentum? In the absence of a
pressing crisis perhaps the topic has never been seen as
sufficiently compelling to earn space on a crowded national policy
agenda. "
Many odious debt reform advocates place their hopes in the
courtroom rather than political institutions, believing that the
odious debt doctrine either already exists in the law or can be
derived from other well-established legal principles. Supporters of
the first approach traditionally make their case on the basis of
international law. I refer to this line of argument, extending back
to the early nineteenth-century, as the "Classical Model" of odious
debt reform. 13 The second approach is a more recent variant set
forth by Lee Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, and Robert Thompson
(referred to herein as the "Private Law" model). 14  Buchheit,
12 In another work I argued that traditional proponents of odious debt reform might
look to break this inertia by seeking support in the national security community. See
Jonathan Shafter, The Due Diligence Model: A New Approach to the Problem of Odious
Debts, 21 J. ETHICS & INT'L. AFF. 49, 52-53 (2007); see also Seema Jayachandran,
Michael Kremer, & Jonathan Shafter, Applying the Odious Debt Doctrine while
Preserving Legitimate Lending (Stanford Program on Global Justice Working Paper,
June 2006), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21472/Applying
theOdiousDebtsDoctrine.pdf Post-Cold War strategic doctrine in the United States
places failed state intervention at the forefront of Western national security planning.
See The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 1
(Sept. 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf ("America is now threatened less
by conquering states than we are by failing ones"). Odious debt reform would help
facilitate the timely reconstruction of post-authoritarian failed states by freeing scarce
resources for public investment rather than debt service.
13 An excellent argument for the proposition that the odious debt doctrine is an
existing component of international law is made by Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King, and
Bryan Thomas. Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King, & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious
Debt Doctrine (Ctr. for Int'l Sustainable Dev. L. Working Paper, 2003),
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/Advancing-the-OdiousDebtDoc
trine.pdf. King finds support for the doctrine in each of the four foundational pillars of
international law: international conventions, international custom, general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations, and the judicial decisions and teachings of the most
qualified legal publicists of the world's nations. Id. at 2-4. King does appear to
somewhat overstate his case by concluding that the doctrine of odious debt has
"considerable support under the traditional categories of international law." Id. at 48.
However, if the odious debt doctrine was indeed firmly established as international
custom, then we would doubtless see more examples of its usage in the modern era.
14 See Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of
Odious Debt (Duke L.J. Working Paper, 2006), available at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/
[Vol. XXXII
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Gulati, and Thompson make a very persuasive case that a formal
odious debt doctrine is unnecessary under American law as similar
results can be achieved via well-established principles of domestic
private law. 5 The authors raise four possible legal defenses for
sovereigns seeking to repudiate illegitimate debts in American
courts. First, bribery of governmental officials is manifestly
contrary to public policy and courts may in extreme circumstances
take public policy into consideration to deny enforcement of
otherwise valid contracts. 16 Second, where a lender knowingly
facilitated foreign governmental corruption, its claims may be
barred on the equitable basis of unclean hands. 7 The final two
Private Law sovereign defenses are based on conceptualizing the
relationship between a regime and its state along principal-agent
lines. Thus, where a lender knew or reasonably should have
known that an agent (i.e., government regime) engaged in self-
dealing in violation of the duty to act for the benefit of its principal
(i.e., the state), such debts will not attach to the state. 8 Finally, the
Private Law model invokes an analogy to the corporate law
doctrine of veil piercing. 9  Where the corporate form is
egregiously abused to perpetrate a harm, courts may refuse to
honor the corporation's limited liability structure.2" Similarly, the
Private Law authors suggest that courts should look through the
state to its governing regime where the state form is abused for the
regime's personal benefit.2'
Even if we assume that these arguments are correct and the
doctrine of odious debt, or a functional domestic equivalent, is
good law, not all good law is suitable for judicial oversight. 22 The
political question doctrine of American constitutional law
archive/00001567/01/Dilemma ofOdiousDebts_9-20-06.pdf.
15 Id. at 29-30.
16 Id. at31.
17 Id. at 34-36.
18 Id. at 36-40.
19 Id. at 44-47.
20 Buchheit, Gulati, & Thompson, supra note 14, at 45.
21 Id. at 47.
22 Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King, and Bryan Thomas present an extensive strategic
analysis on the appropriateness of various judicial venues for advancing the odious debt
doctrine. See Khalfan, King, & Thomas, supra note 13, at 57-75.
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acknowledges that, in some circumstances, the question of what is
good law is separable from the question of whether a court can or
should implement that law.23
The political question doctrine is best understood as an
umbrella under which two somewhat independent constitutional
concepts find shelter. The first strand of the political question
doctrine deals with the constitutional separation of powers
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the
federal government. In Baker v. Carr, the Court expressed its
reluctance to involve itself in political questions where it finds one
of the following:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; ... or the
impossibility, of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.24
The Court's aversion to questions reserved for the political
branches is quite strong. In no sphere is the judiciary more wary
to risk treading upon the just prerogatives of another governmental
branch as foreign affairs. Courts consistently apply a strong
presumption of deference to the executive in foreign affairs based
on "residual" executive authority over international matters.25
This deference is strongest where the text of the Constitution
makes an explicit grant of executive power. One power the
Constitution directly vests in the executive branch is the authority
23 See U.S. Dep't of Com. v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992) ("In invoking the
political question doctrine, a court acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional
provision may not be judicially enforceable. Such a decision is of course very different
from determining that specific congressional action does not violate the Constitution.").
24 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
25 See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive
Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (providing an historical
understanding of the Constitution's allocation of broad "residual" foreign affairs
discretion to the executive where power has not been explicitly assigned to another
governmental branch).
[Vol. XXXII
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to recognize foreign governments.26 Thus, in Baker the Court
declared that "recognition of foreign governments so strongly
defies judicial treatment that without executive recognition a
foreign state has been called 'a republic of whose existence we
know nothing.'
27
The executive's recognition power has a scope extending
beyond simple acknowledgement that a foreign government is the
legitimate representative of its state. The executive also has the
authority to decide for purposes of United States law, who speaks
for a foreign government and what actions of that government are
legitimate. An early and fascinating example of this doctrine can
be found in Justice Taney's opinion in Doe v. Branden.8 At issue
in Doe was title to a large parcel of Florida land.29 The crux of the
dispute was whether the 1821 treaty ceding Florida from Spain to
the United States annulled the Duke of Alagon's title to a large
part of the ceded territory.3° The Duke had been granted ten
million acres of Florida property by the King of Spain prior to
ratification of the treaty. 3' Although the treaty document signed
by the King directly revoked the Duke's title, a successor to the
Duke's land interest argued that the King lacked power under
Spanish law to do so. 32 Justice Taney dismissed the case as an
inappropriate matter for judicial evaluation, stating that pursuant
to his powers of recognition and treaty making, the President is
enabled to:
26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("he shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers"); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964)
("[p]olitical recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive").
27 Baker, 369 U.S. at 212.
28 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
29 Id. at 636, 654.
30 Id. at 654-55. The treaty was originally ratified in 1819, id. at 654, but was re-
ratified in 1821 with an addendum stating that it was the understanding of both parties
when the original treaty was signed that any prior grants of the property ceded by the
treaty were annulled, including any grant to the Duke of Alagon. Id. at 656. The
original treaty had stated only that any grants of the property in question made since
January 24, 1818 would be annulled. Id. at 655. For the full text of the treaty, see Treaty
of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of America and His
Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, Oct. 29, 1820, 8 Stat. 252.
31 Doe, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 654.
32 Id. at 655.
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obtain accurate information of the political condition of the
nation with which he treats; who exercises over it the powers of
sovereignty, and under what limitations; and how far the party
who ratifies the treaty is authorized, by its form of government,
to bind the nation and persons and things within its territory and
dominion .... [I]t would be impossible for the executive
department of the government to conduct our foreign relations
with any advantage to the country, and fulfill the duties which
the Constitution has imposed upon it, if every court in the
country was authorized to inquire and decide whether the person
who ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the
power, by its constitution and laws, to make the engagements
into which he entered.33
Doe demonstrates the extreme deference required by the
Constitution to a President's decision on who may speak for a
foreign state and how far that regime may go in binding its state.
Furthermore, the Executive has the sole right to decide what
limitations exist on the regime's sovereign powers. In other
words, the Executive has exclusive authority not only to recognize
a foreign state's government, but to define that state's system of
government. This determination of the boundaries of a regime's
public powers is binding upon the judiciary and may not be
challenged by an evidentiary analysis of the state's domestic laws.
Thus, a foreign state's constitution might enshrine a despotic
regime as domestically omnipotent, but if the executive declares
limits on that regime's public authority, then regime behavior
outside those boundaries must be treated as a private act.
Subsequent cases reveal that the Executive has broad powers
to preempt matters normally within the province of the judiciary
pursuant to its recognition of a foreign government. In particular,
the Executive is empowered to settle legal claims involving a
foreign sovereign where those claims interfere with United States
foreign policy objectives. One such case, United States v. Pink,
concerned the assets of the New York subsidiary of a Russian
insurance company nationalized by the Soviet government in
1918.34 The Pink Court held that the "[executive's recognition]
authority is not limited to a determination of the government to be
33 Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
34 315 U.S. 203, 210 (1942).
[Vol. XXXIH
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recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy which is
to govern the question of recognition. 35 Accordingly, the Court
found that where the executive decides that outstanding private
claims between its citizens and a foreign sovereign impede
broader United States policy objectives, "[p]ower to remove such
obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our
nationals... certainly is a modest implied power of the
President.
3 6
Another case demonstrating the power of executive
recognition is Dames & Moore v. Regan. Dames stemmed from
the breakdown of relations between the United States and Iran
following the Iranian hostage crisis.38 The petitioner brought suit
in a federal district court alleging that it had performed services
for the pre-revolutionary Iranian government without payment,
and orders of attachment were issued against certain Iranian assets
held frozen in the United States to secure a potential judgment.3 9
Subsequent to that attachment, the hostage situation was resolved
via the Algiers Accords (implemented by Executive Order) under
which the United States committed to terminate any claims,
judgments, or attachments of U.S. nationals against Iran and
transfer such claims to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal for
binding arbitration.4 ° In accordance with this Executive Order, the
petitioner's attachment was vacated and its claims against Iran
stayed.4 The petitioner then filed for declarative and injunctive
relief, claiming the United States government exceeded its
statutory and constitutional authority.42
The Court found that the President had statutory authority to
nullify the Petitioner's attachment under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, but could find no statutory
basis for an executive power to suspend claims pending in
35 Id. at 229.
36 Id.
37 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
38 Id. at 662-63.
39 Id. at 663-64.
40 Id. at 664-66.
41 Id. at 666.
42 Id. at 666-67.
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American courts.43 Nevertheless, the Court held that by not
expressly denying this power to the President, the legislature
implicitly assented to the President's traditional authority to settle
claims between its nationals and foreign governments where such
claims threaten American foreign policy objectives.' The Court
commented that, "It]hough those settlements have sometimes been
made by treaty, there has also been a longstanding practice of
settling such claims by executive agreement without the advice
and consent of the Senate."45
The Algiers Accords 46 contain a section of particular relevance
for odious debt reform. Under the Accords, the United States
pledged to:
freeze, and prohibit any transfer of, property and assets in the
United States within the control of the estate of the former Shah
or of any close relative of the former Shah served as a defendant
in U.S. litigation brought by Iran to recover such property and
assets as belonging to Iran.47
The United States also agreed that "the claims of Iran should not
be considered legally barred either by sovereign immunity
principles or by the Act of State doctrine and that Iranian decrees
and judgments relating to such assets should be enforced by such
courts in accordance with United States law., 48  Note that no
43 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675.
44 Id. at 679.
45 Id. at 680.
46 The Algiers Accords is the name given to an executive agreement signed in
1981. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, U.S.-AIg., Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 223.
47 Id. at Point IV, § 12.
48 Id. at Point IV, § 14. The Act of State doctrine is best enunciated in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Banco Nacional de Cuba
involved the expropriation of sugar by a corporation with largely American shareholders
in 1960. Id. at 401. The question raised was whether the expropriation decree was legal
under Cuban law. Justice Harlan, echoing the earlier words of Chief Justice Marshall,
stated:
[olne nation must recognize the act of a sovereign power of another, so long as
it has jurisdiction under international law, even if it is improper according to the
internal law of the latter state .... An inquiry by the United States courts into
the validity of an act of an official of a foreign state under the law of that state
would not only be exceedingly difficult but, if wrongly made, would be likely to
be highly offensive to the state in question.
[Vol. XXXII
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reference is made in the Accords to the citizenship of the Shah or
his relatives. This suggests that the Executive's recognition-based
claims settling powers are not limited to claims between U.S.
citizens and a foreign sovereign, but encompass any U.S. litigation
involving a foreign sovereign which significantly implicates
foreign relations.49
Another relevant opinion is the Second Circuit's decision in
767 Third Avenue Associates v. Consulate General of Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.50 In 767 Third Ave., landlords of
Yugoslavia's leased New York consular offices brought suit
against the former nation's successor states for unpaid rent.5 The
Second Circuit found that this suit raised "virtually all of the
Baker v. Carr factors," and was therefore nonjusticiable as "the
allocation of debt among the successors might hinder or prejudice
the future resolution of this issue through negotiations or another
determination by the Executive."52  For the Second Circuit,
"questions of title [are] 'inextricably intertwined with the question
of state succession and sovereignty,' which are reserved to
determination by the executive branch."53 Thus, 767 Third Ave.
indicates that the recognition power gives the executive authority
to decide which debts are inherited by a foreign successor regime.
Precedent therefore establishes the following aspects of the
recognition power:
1. The recognition power includes the authority to decide who
represents a foreign state and the scope of that
Id. at 415 n.17. Justice Harlan further explained that this "Act of State" doctrine is not
mandated by international law; but rather, arises out of our Constitutional separation of
powers. Id. at 423.
49 The Executive's powers are not totally unbounded. The Ninth Circuit ruled that
a construction of the Algiers Accords which allowed the taking of assets from a U.S.
resident without due process of law would "raise grave questions about the enforceability
of that part of the Accords." Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir.
1995). The Dames Court, although not ruling directly on the matter, commented that the
President may have the power to settle claims between U.S. nationals and Iran, but that
this does not necessarily preclude the aggrieved national from raising a takings claim
against the U.S. government. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689.
50 218 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2000).
51 Id. at 155.
52 Id. at 160.
53 Id. at 161 (citing Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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representative's authority to act on behalf of its public.
2. The executive has broad discretion to settle foreign
sovereign claims in connection with normalizing foreign
relations.
3. Recognition powers are applicable in cases of both state and
regime succession.
4. The recognition power is exclusively executive. 4
Every power necessary to implement an odious debt reform policy
is contained within the executive's recognition authority. A
corollary of this fact is that there are significant limits on judicial
power over odious debts, but this bar is not absolute. A series of
cases involving litigation against deposed dictators in American
courts show that there may be some scope for judicial jurisdiction
over the subset of odious debts implicating theft of public funds.
In Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, the Republic of
Philippines sought an injunction preventing Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos, and others, from transferring or encumbering properties
alleged to have been purchased with funds illegally stolen from the
Republic.55 The Second Circuit denied Marcos' argument that this
case was unfit for adjudication due to the Act of State doctrine,
noting that while the Act of State doctrine does apply to actions of
a foreign sovereign (including acts of officials purportedly
behaving in their official capacity) it is irrelevant with respect to
purely private behavior.5 6 The Ninth Circuit came to a similar
conclusion in a different stream of Marcos litigation, stating:
[aJlthough sometimes criticized as a ruler and at times invested
with extraordinary powers, Ferdinand Marcos does not appear to
have had the authority of an absolute autocrat. He was not the
state, but the head of the state, bound by the laws that applied to
him. Our courts have had no difficulty in distinguishing the
legal acts of a deposed ruler from his acts for personal profit that
lack a basis in law.57
Two other cases where courts found that former heads of state
were acting in a private capacity are United States v. Noriega58 and
54 See supra text accompanying notes 28-53.
55 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1986).
56 Id. at 359-60.
57 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988).
58 United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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Jimenez v. Aristeguieta.9  Similar to the Marcos cases, these
actions were brought by successor regimes to recover allegedly
stolen state property. 60  Noriega and Jiminez, both deposed
dictators, each claimed that as autocrats all of their actions were de
facto public acts.6' In each case, this argument received a level of
judicial respect on par with the esteem the French Revolutionary
National Council had for Louis XIV's theory that "'etat c'est
moi" when they removed his descendant's head for treason. 62 The
Noriega court ruled that:
[t]his sweeping position completely ignores the public/private
distinction and suggests that government leaders are, as such,
incapable of engaging in private, unofficial conduct. Aside from
its lack of logic, suffice it to say that this argument has been
implicitly rejected in several cases distinguishing the private
from public conduct of heads of state and foreign dictators.63
Indicating that the Act of State doctrine' might apply if Noriega
had conducted his drug smuggling and money laundering
operations on behalf of the Panamanian state, the court failed to
see how these crimes "could conceivably constitute public
action. 65  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit mocked Jimenez's
pretensions to personally embody Venezuelan sovereignty:
Even though characterized as a dictator, appellant was not
himself the sovereign-government--of Venezuela within the
Act of State Doctrine. He was chief executive, a public officer,
of the sovereign nation of Venezuela .... Appellant's acts
constituting the financial crimes of embezzlement or
malversation, fraud or breach of trust, and receiving money or
valuable securities knowing them to have been unlawfully
obtained as to which probable cause of guilt had been shown
59 Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962)
60 Id. at 552.
61 Jimenez, 311 F.2d at 553; Noriega, 746 F. Supp at 1522.
62 See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 475:16 (Elizabeth Knowles ed.,
5th ed. 1999).
63 Noriega, 746 F.Supp at 1522.
64 The Act of State doctrine provides that "every sovereign is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
65 Noriega, 746 F. Supp at 1522.
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were not acts of Venezuela sovereignty .... They constituted
common crimes committed by the Chief of State done in
violation of his position and not in pursuance of it. They are as
far from being an act of state as rape which appellant concedes
would not be an 'Act of State'.6 6
How can we reconcile the willingness of the courts in the
dictator cases to probe the public-private nature of these fallen
leaders' actions with the executive's exclusive power to define the
boundaries of a foreign regime's public authority? To begin with,
in the dictator cases the public-private question was raised in the
context of the Act of State doctrine-a flexible, prudential judicial
doctrine not mandated by statute, constitution, or international
law.67 If the executive had explicitly utilized its authority to define
a foreign state's form of government and affirmed the dictators'
claims that their alleged deeds were indeed legitimate public acts,
then these cases would have terminated not on act of state grounds
but on the failure to state a claim. In each case the executive
advocated for a denial of the act of state defense. We can infer
from this precedent that the personal conversion of state property
in violation of that state's internal laws is by default excluded
from the United State's recognition of a regime's valid scope for
pubic authority.
A prior regime's solely private actions warrant little special
treatment in our judicial system. Sovereign borrowing is
undoubtedly a public action. 68 But if the theft of state funds is a de
facto private act, then sovereign lenders have the same equitable
obligation to avoid abetting a regime's private self-dealing that
they would in any other commercial transaction. This public-
private distinction is the key which facilitates the Private Law
model defenses against the enforcement of debt obligations by
lenders with actual or imputed knowledge of their role in a scheme
to defraud the regime's state. The locus of analysis is not on the
regime's public act of borrowing funds but on the subsequent
66 Jimenez, 311 F.2d at 557-58.
67 See supra text accompanying note 64.
68 Public action here refers to the valid capacity of a regime to act as an agent of
the state. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which relegates borrowing to the status
of a commercial, not sovereign, act, is not relevant in this context. See Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
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private act of theft.
Unfortunately there are sharp limits on the scope of this
approach. Illegal looting of public funds is perhaps the most
common illegitimate use of debt financing but there are certainly
others. Regimes borrow funds to finance mechanisms of internal
domestic repression and wage hostile, external wars. For example,
Saddam Hussein's military waged multiple genocidal campaigns
against domestic opponents such as the Kurds and the Marsh
Arabs and launched an aggressive war of conquest against Iran.69
By what logic should the Iraqi people inherit debts used to finance
their own subjugation or ill-conceived wars they had no ability to
stop? But as repulsive as Saddam's campaigns of genocide and
foreign aggression were, there is no basis to presume they were
not public acts. Thus, the executive could decide that Saddam
lacked public authority to bind the Iraqi state with debts used to
finance his apparatus of repression, but a court would be
prohibited from making any such determination.7 °
69 See John F. Bums, Hussein's Voice Speaks in Court In Praise of Chemical
Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at Al; John F. Bums, The Killing of Iraq's Ancient
Marsh Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, § 4, at 14.
70 This does raise some interesting theoretical questions. The executive could settle
Saddam's debts through its claims-settling power pursuant to establishing normal
diplomatic relations with the new Iraqi govemment even if those debts are legally
legitimate. On the other hand, if the executive stated that Saddam's public mandate did
not include the power to wage hostile wars or conduct internal repression, then lenders
seeking enforcement of debts connected with those actions would face the same
equitable defenses as a theft situation. But is the executive recognition power
retroactive? Can the executive now declare that Saddam did not have sovereign
authority for certain acts if evidence demonstrated that the United States in fact
sanctioned these acts as legitimately public functions at the time? Such declarations as
default rules of recognition might also be problematic. After all, the power to wage war
is the ultimate public function. If the executive stated that no regime could claim public
authority to wage illegitimate wars, the regime's state would be absolved of any
responsibility even if it was the enthusiastic mandate of a democratic populace.
What of a potential rule that no regime has the public authority to wage an illegitimate
war without public consent? While this might be a desirable policy, it would be difficult
to apply in a judicial setting. Whether a war was legitimate under international law
would almost certainly be a political question in American law and thus unsuitable for
judicial determination, and courts would have significant problems applying a legal
standard of popular consent-as will be explained in the following section.
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B. Nonjusticiability
It is unlikely that Congress could reallocate a portion of the
recognition power to the judiciary to facilitate odious debt
litigation. The Supreme Court has thus far avoided a clear
statement on the limits of Congressional power to override
traditional executive foreign affairs powers. But here the
executive's powers are rooted in an explicit, not residual,
constitutional allocation. Even if such legislation were
constitutionally feasible it would not be advisable. This brings us
to the second strand of the political question doctrine-
nonjusticiability. A matter is nonjusticiable and thus not a proper
subject for judicial determination if "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" cannot be devised which are clear and
universal.7
Nonjusticiability raises the fascinating question of how, if at
all, the judicial role differs from that of explicitly political
institutions. This question has been at the heart of legal
scholarship ever since the breakdown of formalism. The
nonjusticiability doctrine presumes that judicial power is
ultimately bounded by the need to make decisions in accordance
with clear universal standards. The judiciary must abstain from
matters which defy resolution within this framework. Justice
Scalia expounded on this view in Vieth v. Jubilier:
'The judicial Power' created by Article III, § 1, of the
Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do... or even
whatever Congress chooses to assign them ... . It is the power
to act in the manner traditional for English and American courts.
One of the most obvious limitations imposed by that
requirement is that judicial action must be governed by
standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch
can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the
courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned
distinctions.72
In Vieth, Scalia asserts that nonjusticiability is not merely a
pragmatic doctrine but a constitutional limitation on judicial
jurisdiction. This idea found earlier expression in Nixon v. United
71 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
72 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
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States, wherein Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that separation
of powers and nonjusticiability were not wholly distinct, but
rather, "the lack of judicially manageable standards may
strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable
commitment to a coordinate branch. 73
Of what relevance is this for odious debts? Recall that the
classic definition of odious debt is an obligation incurred without
public consent and utilized for illegitimate purposes.74 I posit that
the question of whether a debt was incurred without popular
consent is a quintessentially nonjusticiable issue.
In Vieth the Court ruled that political gerrymandering
substantively disadvantaging the capacity of certain groups to
effectively engage in the political process violates the Equal
Protection Clause. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the judiciary
should abstain from arbitrating such claims on grounds that no
principled and consistent standards have been found to distinguish
permissible voting districts from those that are impermissible. In
light of a ruling in which the Supreme Court admits that it must
abdicate enforcement of the Constitution because it cannot devise
a reasonable standard of when the rights of American citizens to
domestic political representation have been abrogated, it seems
improbable that the judiciary could decide whether the actions of
foreign governments were authorized by adequate popular
consent.
No workable standards presently exist to systematically
determine if a foreign government's action was sanctioned by
public consent, and it is questionable whether such standards are
even possible. Some scholars contend that this pessimism is
unwarranted. For example, Thomas Franck believes there is an
emerging global entitlement to democracy under which
international governmental legitimacy is increasingly conditional
upon popular consent.75  Franck finds that the democratic
entitlement already possesses a high degree of legitimacy and
specificity drawn from treaty texts and the practices of global,
73 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 224 (1993).
74 See SACK, supra note 1, at 127.
75 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 91 (1992).
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regional, and non-governmental organizations.76 Gregory Fox
goes even further in his examination of a range of treaty sources
and the conduct of United Nations electoral monitoring missions.77
Fox found that indeterminacy over the contents of a right to
participation, a right which he defines as elections based on
multiple political parties and certain other universal procedural
elements, "no longer exists. 78  Matthew Griffin establishes
empirical support for the existence of the democratic entitlement
in the actions of the UN between 1991 and 1999, when
accreditation was denied to five governments in effective control
of existing states (Haiti, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Liberia, and
Afghanistan) due to a lack of democratic credentials.79
By no means would I argue against the desirability of some
baseline universal norm of global democratic governance. But the
existence of a legal right and the appropriateness of arbitrating that
right in a judicial setting are two different issues. When a court
operates under vague, ad hoc general principles, it violates
widespread norms of institutional legitimacy. Even some
advocates of the emerging global entitlement to democratic
representation concede that the concept is still too vague for
judicial application.8" In one of its earliest cases on this subject,
the Supreme Court ruled that, although Article IV of the
Constitution guarantees to each state a republican form of
government, it is for Congress, not the courts, to oversee its
enforcement.8 Similarly, determinations of foreign governments'
76 Id.
77 Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 607 (1992).
78 Id.
79 Matthew Griffin, Accrediting Democracies: Does The Credentials Committee of
the United Nations Promote Democracy Through Its Accreditation Process, and Should
It?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 725, 725 (2000).
80 In his article, Matthew Griffin concludes that the "difficulties of devising a
definition of democracy, and the litany of problems associated with designing a new
credentials test, are significant. However, there is room for the credentials process to
serve the interests of democracy, though in a less systematic and rigorous manner." Id.
at 783. Franck, however, is a notable proponent of the idea that all questions are
justiciable and denies a conceptual divide between the political and judicial spheres of
competence. See Franck, supra note 75, at 91.
81 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
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public mandates are best left to political institutions.
The case that intelligible, universal standards of popular
consent can be derived from treaty law and international custom is
unpersuasive. Even if a sufficient base of precedent exists-from
decades of multination election monitoring-to clearly define the
requisites of a free and fair election, this still fails to answer a
necessary second question: free and fair elections for what? In
Bush v. Gore the world watched as an election for the American
presidency turned on the constitutional musings of nine unelected
figures with lifetime tenure. Imagine how strange and
undemocratic this must have appeared to those without knowledge
or appreciation for the reverence Americans have for the delicate
checks and balances in our federal architecture. When tempers
settled, the vast majority of Americans accepted the election's
outcome and retained faith in the legitimacy of the Supreme Court,
despite the fact that many were unsatisfied with the ultimate
result.83
Now consider Turkey's unique system of checks and balances.
Kemal Ataturk forged the modern nation of Turkey from the ruins
of the Ottoman Empire, and since that time, the military has
conceptualized its role as the guardian of his secular vision.84 In
1960, 1971, and 1980, the military forcibly displaced civilian
governments it saw as threatening the nation's secular democratic
orientation, and, as recently as 1997, pressured the elected Islamist
government to abdicate power.85 Yet, in September of 2005, a
newspaper poll found that the military is Turkey's most trusted
institution.86  While Turkey's military-civilian relationship has
moved closer to Western norms as a result of EU accession talks,
the Turkish military retains a quasi-constitutional role unthinkable
in most democracies.87 What clear rule can distinguish between
82 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
83 Dan Balz, Victory for Bush; Texan Claims Presidency After Gore Concedes
Election; Both Pledge Unity and End to 'Bitterness' and 'Rancor', WASH. POST, Dec. 14,
2000, at A01.
84 Dogan Akyaz, Ersel Aydinli, & Nihat Ali Ozcan, The Turkish Military's March
Towards Europe, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 77-78.
85 Id. at 78-80.
86 Id. at 78.
87 Id. at 77-90.
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the examples of the United States and Turkey? Would that rule
also encompass the Iranian case where elected bodies exist in
ultimate subordination to clerical authority?
At some point, the subordination of the powers of
democratically elected officials to non-elected institutions crosses
a line where the mere fact that elections are held becomes an
insufficient proxy for popular consent. Moreover, should we even
be looking for universal standards, or is the proper question
whether a specific populace views its own institutional
arrangements as legitimate? Is it enough that, by and large, the
American public recognized the legitimacy of the Supreme Court
to intervene in the 2000 election or must such intervention meet a
universal global standard?
Another example of popular consent's indeterminacy is
proportional representation. For example, the Lebanese
Constitution reserves specific political offices along religious lines
and Parliamentary seats are allocated half to Christians and half to
Muslims.18 This sensitive balance of power was the Ta'if Accord,
the negotiated compromise that represented the end of a brutal
civil war. 9 However, it is estimated that Lebanon's population is
now nearly 60% Muslim and almost 40% Christian.90 Does the
disproportionate political representation of Lebanese Christians
mean that Lebanon's government lacks public consent? There is
no clear method for comparing this to the American Senate, where
the half-million citizens of Wyoming possess voting power on par
with California's thirty-six million.9' The same is true in Japan,
where the Liberal Democratic Party has maintained a near
monopolistic control over the Japanese political system due to the
88 CONSTITUTION, Tit. 2, Ch. 2, Art. 24 (Leb.).
89 The Ta'if Accord, which ended the Lebanese civil war in 1989, states an
objective of eventually eliminating sectarianism from the Lebanese political system.
This goal has not yet been achieved. For a discussion of the Ta'if Accords, see JOSEPH
MAILA, THE TA'IF ACCORD: AN EVALUATION IN PEACE FOR LEBANON? FROM WAR TO
RECONSTRUCTION 31-44 (1994). The Ta'if Accord deals with all facets of Lebanon's
reconstruction, from political, economic and social rebuilding to the withdrawal of
foreign forces from Lebanon. See id.
90 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK 2006, at 320 (2006).
91 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 Quickfacts, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/56000.htm and http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/O6O00.html.
[Vol. XXXH
2007] ODIOUS DEBT REFORM-THE DUE DILIGENCE MODEL 689
vastly disproportionate voting power of rural areas.92 It is not
clear when exactly the distribution of electoral power across
different population segments becomes so disproportionate that
popular consent fails. And again, it is far from certain that we can
create a clear, predictable, and global legal standard to draw that
line. The allocation of electoral representation is so dependent on
each nation's specific historical context that universal rules seem
highly improbable.
Justice Kennedy distinguished his concurrence in Vieth from
the plurality determination that gerrymandering cases are prima
facie nonjusticiable.93 Kennedy found that simply because jurists
had yet to find clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards
to prevent future cases from arriving at "disparate and
inconsistent" results, this was not proof that such a standard would
never be found.94 Accordingly, while Kennedy agreed that the
Court must refrain from intervention in Vieth, he would not bar
future cases should workable standards someday be developed. 95 I
take Justice Kennedy's perspective with regards to a judicially
manageable standard for popular consent. Until a workable
standard is developed, however, determining what government
acts were performed with popular consent is more suitable for
political, rather than judicial determination.
International lawyers may see this discussion of American
constitutional precedent as somewhat parochial. But even where
the nonjusticiability doctrine has no binding precedential value it
should be regarded as a good principle of institutional design.
Any judicial venue-whether one already existing or a future
international tribunal established specifically to arbitrate odious
debt claims-will confront the problem of developing clear,
universal standards for popular consent. If a court's jurisdiction is
not thwarted by the inability to find such standards, a court will
have no choice but to rule on the basis of ad hoc, inconsistent
principles. In short, the venue will, for all intents and purposes, be
a political rather than a judicial institution. The political question
92 See William Somers Bailey, Reducing Malapportionment in Japan's Electoral
Districts: the Supreme Court Must Act, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 169, 169 (1997).
93 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306-17.
94 Id. at 308, 311.
95 Id. at 311.
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doctrine may be a specific quirk of American law, but the idea that
judicial institutional legitimacy is contingent upon consistent,
universal reasoning extends well beyond U.S. borders. If there is
such a thing as a global idea of the rule of law, consistency and
universality are surely elements of its definition.
Vague ad hoc judicial decision-making would also deny
lenders the ability to predict compliance with odious debt lending
standards. In the absence of reasonable predictability, rational
lenders would either curtail financing to all but the most black-
and-white exemplars of democratic legitimacy or demand greater
compensation for assuming the risk of legal uncertainty. In either
scenario, entirely legitimate non-odious credit for developing
nations would be restricted. The magnitude of this chilling effect
would be proportional to creditor uncertainty over potential
liability under odious debt standards. The more clarity lenders
have prior to committing funds to a sovereign, the less interference
odious debt reforms will have on legitimate financial transactions.
Unfortunately, most judicial institutions are too poorly structured
to offer clear ex-ante guidance.96
Judicial institutions are inhospitable venues for the odious debt
doctrine. The Classical Model approach is unlikely to make much
headway in an American courtroom. Even if the hurdle of proving
the odious debt doctrine's legal validity under international law is
surmounted, multiple prongs of the political question doctrine
create a formidable barrier against its judicial application. The
Private Law approach is more promising but seems limited to the
narrow subset of odious debt situations concerning theft. While an
improvement on the status quo, too many harms remain outside
the scope of its reach for satisfaction. Even if it could be extended
beyond theft situations, the Private Law approach shares
significant drawbacks with all judicial based policy models-
whether in domestic, foreign, or multinational settings. Judicial
institutions are designed to accommodate ex post dispute
resolution rather than ex ante problem solving and with ex post
uncertainty comes very real deadweight economic costs for both
investors and borrowers.
96 For an extensive microeconomic analysis of ex ante versus ex post approaches to
odious debt, see Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, AM. ECON. REV.,
Mar. 2006, at 82-92.
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II. The Due Diligence Model of Odious Debt Reform
The previous section discussed problems with judicial
solutions to the odious debt problem. Fortunately, under
American law the executive branch has broad powers to remedy
the problem of odious debts. Unfettered by the need to place each
policy decision in the context of general, universal standards, the
indeterminacy of popular consent is far less of a binding constraint
on the executive than it is for the judiciary. Moreover, with its
broad global reach, the executive is uniquely competent to
understand the local context of foreign political institutions.
While the President has broad powers to prevent the
enforcement of specific odious debts under U.S. law, an ad hoc, ex
post exercise of this power would generate costly uncertainty for
financial markets and developing nations. 9  A better approach
would be to embed this power within an executive branch
institution capable of providing creditors with reasonable ex ante
guidance.9" Consider an executive branch institution placed under
the auspices of the State or Treasury Departments with the power
to designate foreign government regimes as high risk for incurring
odious debts. Such a determination would require a two part test:
First, is it probable that a regime would incur debts without
popular consent? Second, is there a high risk that the debts would
be utilized for illegitimate purposes and cause material harm to the
state's population? If a regime is so designated, future lending to
that government would be considered to be the personal debt of
the regime-and therefore not transferable to a successor
government in the event of regime change-unless there is full
documentation of legitimate public purposes for the financing. 99
Moreover, the creditor would have to gain pre-approval of a due
diligence plan to ensure that debt funding is actually utilized for
the previously stated legitimate purposes.
The form of an actual due diligence plan would be highly
dependent on context. Rather than mandate a fixed approach, the
institution should allow innovative techniques of auditing and
deal-structuring techniques to evolve over time. A proposed plan
97 See Shafter, supra note 12, at 58.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 60.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
must reasonably balance four factors: the potential for public harm
if funds are diverted for illegitimate use, the social utility from the
proposed use of funds, the cost of compliance, and the likelihood
that the proposed due diligence structure will control the use of
funds.'00  "Mechanisms of implementation might include the
employment of certified outside auditors, escrow accounts,
offshore special-purpose vehicles,"' 0 ' or "other deal-structuring
technologies which lower the risk of illicit funds diversion."'0 2
If the implementing institution determines that a proposed use
of funds is legitimate and approves a due diligence plan, it would
grant a formal ex-ante approval. 10 3  Once approval is granted,
enforceability of the loan in a regime change situation is assured
so long as the creditor can produce sufficient evidence that it made
a good faith effort to comply with its pre-approved due diligence
plan.104 If a creditor makes this good faith effort then it would not
be held liable if a creative regime manages to divert funds towards
non-specified ends.0 5  Under this due diligence approach,
creditors would have significant ex ante certainty that credit issued
to a borrower regime not previously designated is free and clear
from potential ex post odious debt complications. 10 6  As it is
expected that regime designation will be a rare action, there will
be a de minimis chilling effect on legitimate sovereign lending.
Furthermore, creditors have a very clear method of establishing
compliance with lending to targeted regimes. As long as a good
faith effort is made to comply with the pre-approved due diligence
plan and proper documentation of that compliance is maintained,
creditors will not be held responsible for outcomes beyond their
control.'07
One potential problem with this plan is its scope. So far we
have assumed that the executive branch of the United States acts
1oo Id. at 61.
101 Id.
102 See Shafter, supra note 12, at 61.
103 See id.
104 Id.
105 Id. Good faith compliance is a fully justiciable empirical question and disputes
over compliance could be a matter for judicial determination.
106 Id.
107 See Shafter, supra note 12, at 61.
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unilaterally. In part, unilateral action may be presumed because
unlike other types of sanctions, an effective odious debt policy
would not require unanimous global participation so long as
nations implementing the policy control a "critical mass" of the
world's credit supply. 10 8 To illustrate this point, assume a world in
which countries controlling half the world's credit supply adopted
a coordinated odious debt policy and half abstained.'0 9 Odious
debt-prone regimes "would still have full access to credit from the
nonparticipating nations of the world."" 0  Non-participant
countries would know, however, that should a designated odious
debt-prone regime collapse, the successor government in that
country would have full access to the credit markets of participant
countries upon repudiating any debts not made within the
structures of the due diligence system."' Since future access to
credit markets is a primary reason why governments pay their
debts, if the participant countries control a sufficient percentage of
the world's credit supply that the successor government could
economically meet its financing needs from participant nation
creditors, it can safely repudiate its odious debts."' In these
circumstances, it is likely that even non-participant nations would
sharply restrict the supply of potentially odious credit to targeted
regimes. 3
But while the United States is certainly a dominant force in
global capital markets, its proportionate dominance is far less than
it once was. At the end of 2006, 45% of international bonds
outstanding were Euro-denominated, versus 36% U.S. dollar and
10% British Pound." 4  With the fulcrum of global economic
growth moving from the mature industrial economies of the West
108 See id. at 63-65.
109 See id. at 63.
110 Id.
I"I Id.
112 See Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 96, at 90.
113 See id. at 82, 90. It should be noted that the extent to which sovereign loans are
made for geopolitical rather than economic reasons will determine how this proposal
would impact the actions of non-participants.
114 Press Release, International Capital Markets Association, ICMA Figures Show
International Bond Market Size Now Stands at Over US $10.5 Trillion (Jan. 4, 2007),
available at http://www.icma-group.org/content/newsl/press.html (follow "January 4,
2007" hyperlink).
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to developing nations such as China, this relative position will
only continue to diminish. To the extent that the aim of an odious
debt policy is not simply to wash our hands of ethical problems,
but rather to prevent such debts from burdening the capacity of
successor governments to build a decent future for their
population, some form of multilateral coordination seems
preferable and perhaps necessary. Multilateral solutions have the
additional benefit of superior legitimacy in the eyes of many
observers. 115
There are several possibilities for the design of a multilateral
approach. One option is to utilize the United Nations Security
Council, which has perhaps unmatched global legitimacy.1 6 The
Security Council is, however, hampered by a cumbersome veto
structure and the membership of nations with less than
wholehearted commitment to the principal of popular consent."
l 7
Another alternative might be an agreement among the Group of
Eight ("G8")" 8 powers, which collectively account for a majority
of global economic output."t 9 A G8 agreement has the advantage
that, as a group of advanced industrial democracies, these nations
have a sufficiently aligned commitment to global democracy so
that coordination is feasible, but retain enough geopolitical rivalry
to mitigate the chances that the sanctions process will be abused. 20
As it is likely that one day China will be incorporated into the
G8,11 a commitment to participate in a common odious debt
policy could be used as one of the requirements for Chinese
accession, thus bringing a substantial segment of the global capital
base into this policy structure.
115 Shafter, supra note 12, at 64.
116 Id.
117 See id.
118 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 716
(Joseph Pickett, et al. eds., Houghton Mifflin Company 4th ed. 2000) (defining "G8" as
the "countries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Representatives from these countries meet to discuss economic
concerns.").
119 Shafter, supra note 12, at 58.
120 See id. at 62.
121 See Minnie Chan, Russia to Propose China and India Be Made Full Members of
G8, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 15, 2006, at 6.
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A multilateral implementation of the Due Diligence proposal
would resemble the unilateral approach described above in most
respects, with the notable exception of collective decision-making
structures. For example, should decisions be made by a majority
vote of the participant governments or should there be a higher
threshold up to the point of requiring unanimity? The higher the
bar is set for consensus, the more protection there is against the
structure being used to improperly punish opponents, but the less
likely it is that it will be properly invoked against legitimate
offenders. Super-majority decision-making structures are
increasingly paralyzing as the group of participant governments
grows broader and more diverse.
III. Conclusion
The Due Diligence policy model should achieve the aims of
odious debt reform while avoiding the problems raised by
arbitrating these questions in judicial venues."2 It acknowledges
that whether or not a government had popular consent for an
action is a question better suited for political, rather than judicial
institutions. In addition, the Due Diligence policy would impose
virtually no costs on legitimate cross-border lending.
Certainly there are questions which demand further
examination. First, fungibility is a potential problem for the
model.'23 The Due Diligence model allows odious debt-prone
regimes to engage in supervised borrowing for legitimate purposes
while curtailing the accumulation of liabilities for improper ends.
It may not be realistic to suppose that funds can be so neatly
segregated, or that regimes won't simply finance illegitimate
projects with internal funds freed up by financing legitimate
budget items with overseas funds. On these grounds, some have
suggested that only a total ban on borrowing by targeted regimes
would be effective. The flexible structure of the Due Diligence
model should allow the supervising organization to consider
fungibility risk on a case-by-case basis and substantially mitigate
this problem. 2 4 For example, if there is a high probability both
that funds will be diverted towards illegitimate uses and that this
122 Shafter, supra note 12, at 58.
123 See id. at 62.
124 Id.
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spending could cause significant harm, then perhaps no feasible
due diligence plan can be approved which balances the risk-
reward equation. This would establish a de facto total loan
embargo. In other cases, public benefits from legitimate projects
financed with appropriate oversight may outweigh fungibility
risks.
Second, this paper assumed that all debts are the same. In
reality, there are important distinctions between private debt,
bilateral debt (government to government), and multilateral debt
(i.e., World Bank).'25 It is unclear if a single policy structure is
appropriate for all three categories.
Finally, it may be obsolete to think in terms of odious debt
rather than odious capital. When the classical doctrine of odious
debt was formulated, debt financing was the only type of capital
market transaction in which governments were engaged. Today
the situation is more complex. Consider the hypothetical case
where a non-democratic regime utilizes funds raised through an
initial public offering of state assets on an overseas stock exchange
for illegitimate ends. The net impact of an "odious privatization"
on subsequent generations is in many ways equivalent to that of
odious debt: aggregate future resources for legitimate public
spending are reduced. If restrictions are only placed on the
capacity of odious debt-prone regimes to finance their illegitimate
pursuits with debt, they may simply turn to auctioning public
assets. Even without transferring actual ownership, regimes could
sell forward contracts on natural resource production to create
synthetic loans. It is also important to consider whether credit
derivatives might be utilized to frustrate the effectiveness of an
odious debt policy.126
The idea of odious debt-that under very specific
circumstances sovereign debts become the personal debts of a
governing regime-is wholly consistent both with international
law and long established traditions of American domestic private
125 See id. at 65-66.
126 This point was raised by Mohammed EI-Erian at the Blue Sky Conference
hosted by the Center for International Development at Harvard University, Sept. 9, 2006.
A video of this session is available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/bluesky/videos.html
(follow "watch video of this session" under "Applying the Odious Debts Doctrine while
Preserving Legitimate Lending").
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law. Much of this article discusses the problems of implementing
the odious debt doctrine in a judicial venue. This is in no way a
defense of the status quo. While there are serious problems with a
judicially-oriented solution to the odious debt problem, it is not
enough to raise objections to a new policy without considering
how harmful it would be to leave the status quo intact. Alleviating
the painful consequences of odious debt might well outweigh a
potential chilling effect on some portion of legitimate cross-border
financing and abstract concerns for the proper scope of judicial
decision-making.
That said, an executive model of odious debt reform-either in
the form of a unilateral executive policy or a multilateral
institution-has many advantages over the classical judicial
approach. Political entities have a lower barrier to making
legitimate decisions where clear, universal legal standards are
difficult to formulate. Executive institutions also have greater
flexibility to engage in ex ante problem-solving than most ex post
oriented judicial venues. Finally, in the American context, judicial
involvement faces possibly fatal constitutional obstacles, while the
executive has all necessary power to implement an odious debt
policy.
This paper began with a discussion of the political forces
which have come into alignment to support American action on
odious debt. Even the most fervent multilateralist would agree
that as the international system's leading power, American
involvement is indispensable for global odious debt reforms. The
executive branch has all the power it needs to act. The only real
obstacle is getting odious debts onto the executive agenda. Odious
debt reform is not only good policy, but it is good politics, and
debt reform advocates should press forward with building public
and political support for executive action. Still, it rarely hurts to
approach a political situation with both a carrot and a stick. The
stick here is the opening for judicial action revealed by Buchheit,
Gulati, and Thompson.'27 Perhaps it is time to probe the Private
Law approach with a test case. At worst, we will find that the
theory fails and there is no judicial alternative to an executive
approach. On the other hand, success would not only represent an
improvement from the status quo, but it could trigger an executive
127 Buchheit, Gulati, & Thompson, supra note 14.
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policy response to prevent a loss of authority over foreign affairs.
It is also likely that the financial community's enthusiasm for
executive action on odious debts would rise once faced with the
long-tailed ex post uncertainties of domestic litigation. It may
seem odd that an article devoted to advancing the merits of an
executive model of odious debt reform over judicial solutions ends
with a call for strategic litigation. But if the essential message of
this text is that odious debt calls for a political solution, then it is
worth contemplating a valuable old saying: "politics makes for
strange bedfellows."' 2
8
128 THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (E.O. Hirsch, et al, eds. 3rd ed.
2002), available at http://www.bartleby.com/59/3/politicsmake.htmi.
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